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Richard Walsh offers an admirably clear outline of his own “rhetorical” theory of fiction, with pithy and telling commentary on certain theories that he rejects. As so often when an exercise of this kind is done well, a reader will find him or herself swept along by the arguments and nodding with agreement. This was certainly my experience and I found the picture on offer—for the most part—both persuasive and congenial. The focus here will be on unpacking that tiresome “for the most part”. 
Everyone comes to the topic of fiction from some perspective or other and this of course will have a profound effect on the constraints in the discussion. My own perspective is that of the analytic philosopher, with a particular interest in aesthetics and the philosophy of literature. Even that perspective can have a wide scope. My fellow analytic aesthetician, Kendall Walton, discussed by Walsh, has a view of fiction rather different from my own, and is prepared to countenance as “fictions” such things as paintings, dolls and toy trucks. Not much sign of “rhetoric” there! But Walton’s target is an account of representation in general and he stipulates that the terms “fiction” and “representation”, in his sense, are interchangeable. 
The point about perspectives is important. Walsh throughout is critical of theories of fiction that give prominence to reference, semantics, ontology, or “worlds”. He has good reasons why he wants to distance his own rhetorical account, involving fiction as a communicative act, from definitions of “fiction” based on those approaches. However, there is no inevitable conflict between his theory and other well-established enquiries, characteristic of analytic philosophy, drawing on different aspects of fiction and raising distinct sets of questions: enquiries into, for example, “empty names” and “negative existentials” (Everett & Hofweber 2000), the logic of fiction (Woods 1975), the metaphysics of fiction (Thomasson 1999), emotion and fiction (Hjort & Laver 1997), or the worlds of fiction (Wolterstorff 1980). Needless to say, there is no reason why Walsh should agree with what philosophers say on these topics—the accounts are controversial and varied—but I am assuming he would not want to reject altogether the very enterprises involved. In other words, enquiries into fiction that centre on reference, semantics, and ontology seem entirely legitimate from the different perspectives they represent, relative to their own distinct framework of questions.
Walsh makes a passing reference to a work I co-authored with Stein Haugom Olsen (Lamarque & Olsen 1994—hereafter L&O), remarking that the model proposed in that book is “congruent with a rhetorical approach” but is to be rejected on the grounds that it “turns out to hinge upon a recuperation of Coleridge’s suspension of disbelief” (11 – page numbers in the circulated text). In fact, “suspension of disbelief” does not figure (by name) in that early book but in a later book of mine the notion is briefly dissected for its possible meanings and set aside as unhelpful (Lamarque 2009, 213). Be that as it may (the phrase is unimportant), the idea that in recognising fictionality a reader adopts a “stance” constraining attitudes and expectations in response, is central to my view. I wonder, though, how different it is au fond to Walsh’s view. On Walsh’s account our response to fiction rests on a “cognitive assumption that a rhetoric of fictionality is in play; an assumption that has the effect of minimising expectations of an utterance’s directly informative relevance” (18): indeed, even more unequivocally, “to assume the fictionality of an utterance is to understand it independently of any directly informative relevance” (24). Furthermore, fictionality calls for a “re-orientation of communicative attention achieved by the contextual assumption of fictionality itself” (20) and “elicits a specific range of cognitive effects” (21); “it has a basic effect upon the way in which the audience seeks to realise the relevance of the communication” (20). And in The Rhetoric of Fictionality, he writes: “The distinction between fiction and nonfiction rests upon the rhetorical use to which a narrative is put, which is to say, the kind of interpretative response it invites in being presented as one or the other.” (Walsh 2007, 45) Isn’t all this at least somewhat like adopting a fictive stance? (Qualifications still to come.) Recognising an utterance as fictive must, of course, make some difference to how an audience responds.
But it would be helpful to rewind and note the parts where there is unmistakable congruence between Walsh’s theory and mine. Both accounts locate fictionality in a context of language use, pragmatics, rather than either in a semantic theory, giving priority to reference and truth-value, or a metaphysical theory, focusing on kinds of objects (imaginary objects, possible non-actual objects, Meinongian non-existent objects, etc).  For Walsh, fictionality “is part of the pragmatics of communication” (3); it is “not a quality of its referent or object of representation” (3); it is “not some mediated kind of falsehood” (3); and it is not to be defined through fictional worlds (“It is not just that fictional-worlds approaches have nothing to say about communicative purposes; it is that they actually foreclose the possibility that the distinctiveness of fiction might have something to do with its communicative use” (6)). 
Olsen and I also have a range of negative, ground-clearing premises, not dissimilar to Walsh’s: “[t]he search for necessary and sufficient conditions [for fictionality] among stylistic or formal features of language is doomed from the start” (L&O 30); “[n]or will subject-matter determine the logical distinction between fiction and non-fiction” (L&O 31); “neither truth-value nor reference determine fictionality, … false sentences alone do not make a work fictional, nor do non-referring names” (L&O 31); “in the case of some simple fictions … it might just be that all the descriptions turn out to be true” (L&O 31-2). More positively, “[f]ictive utterance is ultimately a kind of communication, involving an interaction between speaker (writer) and audience (reader)” (L&O 34); “we should move away from the model of fictional ‘worlds’ as possible worlds and think of them more as imaginative constructs intimately connected to the linguistic forms by which they are characterized” (L&O 94).
The congruence with Walsh should be evident. But, of course, there are differences. The basic structure of my (and Olsen’s) theory is simple:
the fictive dimension of stories (or narratives) is explicable only in terms of a rule-governed practice, central to which are a certain mode of utterance (fictive utterance) and a certain complex of attitudes (the fictive stance). The task of the theorist is to identify the rules of the practice, specifically the contextual conditions governing fictive story-telling, the communicative, or other, purposes fulfilled, the appropriate range of attitudes and responses, the ways in which the practice intersects with other practices, and the many implications of the practice concerning, for example, reference and truth. (L&O 32, italics in original) 
fictive utterance is an act of a certain kind…carried out for a purpose, under the conventions of a practice.  Fundamentally, the purpose is to invoke the conventions of the practice, thereby inviting an appropriate response to the sentences uttered.  In turn the appropriate response involves recognizing that the conventions of the practice are in operation and conforming to them. (L&O 43, italics in original) 
Manifestly, the account contains salient elements that are not present in Walsh’s, most notably reference to a practice. Walsh deploys the theoretical framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986), while I have drawn on the Wittgensteinian notion of a rule-governed practice (Lamarque 2014, Ch. 6). In spite of the congruences noted earlier, this difference is not insignificant. At the risk of gross over-simplification, we might say that the appeal to relevance naturalises fictionality within human communicative processes, while the appeal to practices conventionalises fictionality, as a phenomenon with its own rules and norms. Let me explain briefly and offer a defence of the latter.
Relevance theory is a powerful tool for explaining subtle mechanisms of human communicative exchange. Fictionality, on this model, is assimilated into a broad context of communicative strategies, one among multiple ways in which humans negotiate “ostensive and inferential changes to a mutual cognitive environment” (18). This negotiation follows a pattern to be found elsewhere, involving such phenomena as being ironic, humorous, sarcastic, figurative, non-serious, deliberately obtuse, and so on. If communication is to succeed such phenomena need to be recognised and responded to (underpinned by expectations of relevance). It is all part of the cut and thrust of human social behaviour. There is, of course, always the danger that communication breaks down when the inferential processes fail. 
In contrast, on the practice conception, fictionality stands out as a distinct, more or less conventionalised activity with its own norms of utterance and response. Practices, like this one, have to be learned, even if by example rather than explicit instruction. They involve people acting and responding and are essentially social. They are normative, determining right and wrong modes of action, and they are (loosely) rule-guided. The basic skills of making up stories, telling, repeating, and talking about stories, recognizing them as such, taking up attitudes to them, and responding in appropriate ways, are fundamental to the practice of fiction. They can be learned at an early age.
One advantage of the practice account is that it fills a gap in standard Gricean intentionalist accounts of fictive utterance, whereby a Gricean intention that an audience imagine something is taken to be necessary and sufficient (Currie 2014, Stock 2017). Yet, even when this intention is narrowed down against counter-examples, what is missing is the scene-setting needed to make such an intention realisable. In a context where there is no established practice of fictional story-telling the intention could not be realised. And even if it was realised, perhaps incidentally, that would not determine that the utterance was a fictive utterance, i.e. a piece of fictional discourse. The success of fictive utterance (to secure uptake) depends on mutual knowledge of the practice of story-telling, involving knowledge of the conventions of the fictive stance, that is, the appropriate and intended response. I think there is potentially a similar worry—a gap to be filled—with the relevance account. What can ground the invocation of fictionality in particular cases if there were not already a practice of fiction that guides the recognition of fiction? 
Let me end by returning to the earlier point about different perspectives. The appeal to a practice of fiction, if convincing at all, is likely to be most convincing in a context where the focus is on (fictional) storytelling, rather than on incidental, ad hoc or passing occurrences of fiction in a communicative context (part of a joke, perhaps, or an aside, or a brief allusion). Basic pragmatic inferential processes might indeed be enough to accommodate the latter. My own interest in fictionality, as stated, arises out of aesthetics and philosophy of literature, where the practices of storytelling seem to have deeper roots and more obvious relevance. That perspective drives the practice account. 
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